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THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE TODAY IN
LIGHT OF ITS COMMON LAW BACKGROUND*
DANIEL SHAVIRO"
I. INTRODUCTION
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that "[iun all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted
with the witnesses against him. . .. The words illustrate the difference
between simplicity and clarity. While eloquent and spare, they lack not only
detail, but clear reference. Even if the terms "criminal prosecutions" and
"accused" have - as the expression goes - plain meaning, two ambiguities
almost immediately become apparent. The first is what it means to "confront"
the witnesses against one. To note two highly polar positions among the many
that are possible, Dean Wigmore thought "confrontation" meant cross-
examination,2 and Justice Scalia thinks it means eye contact between the
defendant and an accusing witness while the latter is testifying at trial? The
second ambiguity is who these witnesses are. They might, for example, be only
the persons actually appearing to testify at trial, or alternatively they might be
all persons whose statements are used as evidence against the defendant.4
The usual resources of constitutional history provide little aid in resolving
these ambiguities. In the oft-repeated words of Justice Harlan, the
Confrontation Clause "comes to us on faded parchment." s True, we know
something about its general purpose. Like the hearsay rules, it reflects
0 1991 Daniel Shaviro. All Rights reserved.
Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Fall 1991, Visiting Professor at
Columbia University School of Law. I am grateful to Abner Greene, John Langbein, Geoffrey
Stone, and Richard Uviller for their comments on an earlier draft, and to the Russell Baker
Scholarship Fund and the Walter J. Blum Faculty Research Fund for financial support. Portions of
this article are adapted from an article that previously appeared in the Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly. See Daniel Shaviro, The Supreme Court's Bifurcated Interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 383 (1990).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 131 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter WIGMORE].
3. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988); Maryland v. Craig 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3171-72
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4. See Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3173 (1990); Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right
of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL.
99, 107 (1972).
5. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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common-law abhorrence of the Tudor and Stuart practice of trial by affidavit,
as in the notorious treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603, where a sworn
affidavit by Lord Cobham, possibly obtained under duress, led to Raleigh's
conviction even though Cobham had recanted and was available to testify in
person." Yet there is no direct evidence of the intent underlying the adoption
of the Confrontation Clause. Moreover, the Supreme Court did not first
squarely address the clause until 1895," and considered it only rarely before
1965,' when the Court held for the first time that the clause applies against the
states under the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Adding to the interpretive difficulty, the Confrontation Clause not only does
not say what it means -- by failing to define "confrontation" - but does not
seem to mean what it says. On its face, in at least one respect the text is
unambiguous: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
. .. to be confronted with the witnesses against him. ... This strongly
suggests that unconfronted hearsay testimony in the form of statements made out
of court by the defendant's accusers can never be used to support a criminal
conviction." Yet this interpretation has long been rejected, 2 even by those
who view defendants' rights most expansively. 3  Nor could such an
interpretation have been historically intended given the longstanding hearsay
exception under which dying declarations were admissible as prosecution
6. See CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 244 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d
ed. 1984); ERIC D. GREEN & CHARLES R. NELSON, PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE 273 (1983).
7. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (On retrial of defendant, by the use of a
transcript of testimony at the first trial by a subsequently deceased witness, the Confrontation Clause
was not violated).
8. But see Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899) (Confrontation Clause was violated by
the use of evidence that other persons had been convicted of theft to prove that property received
by the defendant had been stolen).
9. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
ii. This conclusion depends, of course, on the assumption, which I discuss infra at text
accompanying notes 141.43, that persons who do not appear in court are "witnesses" for
Confrontation Clause purposes.
12. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895), in which the Court states: "There
is doubtless reason for saying that the accused should never lose the benefit of any of these
safeguards [i.e., in-court confrontation] even by the death of the witness; and that, if notes of his
testimony are permitted to be read, he is deprived of the advantage of that personal presence of the
witness before the jury which the law has designed for his protection. But general rules of law of
this kind, however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case."
13. Thus, for example, in Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), Justice Brennan agreed that the
Confrontation Clause often permits the use against the defendant of reliable out-of-court statements.
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evidence of the cause of death in homicide cases. 4
The lack of clear textual or historical guidance has encouraged the Supreme
Court to follow a lurching course in its twenty-six years of active Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence, but one whose direction now seems clear. After initially
handing defendants a series of victories, 5 the Court began in 1970 regularly
to reject defendants' challenges. 6  The few defendants' victories in
confrontation cases over the last twenty years are of limited scope and may no
longer command majorities given changes in Court personnel.' 7
The Court's current approach includes not only a fairly predictable
outcome, in favor of the government, but a rough general principle.' As
construed by the Court, the Confrontation Clause bars the following: (1)
excessive limitations on procedures relating to in-court witnesses,' 9 (2) the use
14. The dying declaration rule was well eatablished by the time of the American Revolution.
See MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at § 281.
15. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); Brton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
16. See Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990); United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554
(1988); Boujaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987);
Delaware v. Van Aradall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986); Del.
v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985); Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985); Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56 (1980); Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972);
Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149 (1970).
17. 1 am aware of only four Supreme Court Confrontation Clause cases since 1970 in which
the defendant prevailed. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). holding that cross-examination of
an in-court witness could not be limited by a state rule preserving the confidentially of juvenile court
proceedings, may well remain significant. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), reversing a
conviction based in part on co-defendant's out-of-court confession, prevailed by a vote of only five
to four with Justices Brennan and Marshall among the majority. Even if not openly reversed, Lee
can easily be ignored if the Court is so minded, since it is largely a fact-specific assessment of the
reliability of the particular evidence at issue. In Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), the Court
barred the use of a screen to shield a child witness from having to see the defendant while testifying
in a sex abuse case, the case was decided by 6-2 with Justices Brennan and Marshall in the majority.
However, Cox was cut back significantly by Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990). Idaho v.
Wright, 110 S.Ct. 3139 (1990), overturned a child sex abuse conviction based on a doctor's
testimony repeating what the child told him had happened, also was decided by only 5-4, with
Justices Brennan and Marshall in the majority. The Court in Idaho held that the Confrontation
Clause was violated by the state's failure to disclose to the defendant a file that contained the names
of potential witnesses.
18. 1 described the Supreme Court's position somewhat differently in an earlier article, before
the decision in Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3157 changed the overall picture. See Daniel
Shaviro, The Supreme Court's Bifurcated Interpretation of the Corfrontation, 17 HASTINGS CONsT.
L.Q. 383 (1990) (hereinafter Shaviro].
19. See Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990); United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554
(1988); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308.
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of hearsay evidence that does not meet minimum standards of reliability,' and
(3) the use of hearsay evidence from a witness who is available but not called,
if the witness's appearance in court would have provided better evidence than
the hearsay.2 There is also one prominent alternative to this position: Justice
Scalia's claim that the Confrontation Clause principally creates a requirement of
eye contact between the defendant and in-court witnesses.' Thus, where eye
contact is the issue he would be stricter than the rest of the Court on (one)
above, while equivalent or laxer on (two) and (three), which he concedes might
be "implicit in the Confrontation Clause " ' albeit not at its core.
Surveying this doctrinal background, I have three reactions, one of
historical and textual interpretation to the Court's approach, one of policy to the
Court's approach, and one of both to Justice Scalia's approach. First, from a
historical and textual perspective, I believe that the Court's framework of
analysis is basically sound, but that in some instances it has allowed prosecutors
too much leeway, due to its somewhat unsympathetic attitude in this area
towards defendants. Second, if one ignores the Confrontation Clause and asks
only what would be optimal rules for trials, the Court's position becomes more
defensible, and might even be unnecessarily restrictive of prosecutors. One
could argue powerfully for a more permissive approach to the conduct of trials
than the Confrontation Clause seems to anticipate, relying on the adversary
system to bring out the best evidence and on the jury to draw appropriate
inferences from its non-production. Third, from the perspectives of both history
and policy, I find Justice Scalia's approach deficient.'
As the above paragraph may suggest, I believe that the historical record is
not quite so blank as is commonly assumed. While we know little that is
specific, something can be inferred from the broad shift towards recognizably
modern trial procedures, occurring in England between the sixteenth and
eighteenth centuries, since this shift provided the context for the adoption of the
Confrontation Clause. The context does not answer definitively the close
questions that have arisen since 1965, but it suggests a way of thinking that, if
taken seriously, might lead to an approach more restrictive than either the Court
wants (given the pattern of its holdings) or perhaps than I want (given my
20. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387
(1986); Lee, 476 U.S. 530 (1974)
21. See Bourjaily v. United States 483 U.S. 171 (1987); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387
(1986); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). All three of these limitations apply solely for the
benefit of criminal defendants.
22. See Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3173-74 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
23. Id.
24. 1 have previously argued against Justice Scalia's approach based principally on policy. See
Shaviro, supra note 18, at 397. In the present article I will evaluate his approach principally from
a historical perspective. See infra text accompanying notes 144-45.
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general preference for admitting relevant evidence).
The Confrontation Clause often is described as a reaction to the perceived
injustice of the treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603.' Although, to a
degree, the relationship between the two is a "convenient and highly romantic
myth," 2' it contains an element of truth. Trials such as that of Raleigh, even
if not that trial alone, did prompt the subsequent common law response that led
to both the hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause.'
While the Clause has another important cause -- the colonists' reaction to
England's use, beginning in the 1760s, of vice-admiralty courts to enforce
controversial customs laws such as the Stamp Act' -- the implications of this
reaction resemble those of the Raleigh case. The vice-admiralty courts denied
not only confrontation rights but even the right to trial by jury, in effect
following European civil law practice rather than granting colonists the common
law rights of Englishmen." The American reaction, embodied in the
Confrontation Clause, was to require that English common law rights, including
the right of confrontation evolved in response to abuses such as the Raleigh trial,
would be mandatory under the Constitution.'
I should clarify that, while assuming arguendo that the historical
background is important to constitutional interpretation, I do not insist or rely
upon anything approaching strict "originalism." I claim only that the approach
is sufficiently interesting and important to be relevant to interpreting the
Confrontation Clause. Finally, I should note that this article attempts only to lay
out the basic historical landscape and re-trace ground that, to experts in the area,
will be familiar. I frequently will mention leading theories about the
Confrontation Clause without attempting either to add to them or choose
25. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 n. 16 (1970); Stanley Goldman, Not So "Firmly
Rooted": Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (1987); Laird C.
Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitutional Unavailability
Requirement, 70 MINN. L. REv. 665 (1986); Graham C. Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause
and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 207, 208-09 (1984).
26. Graham, supra note 4, at 100 n.4.
27. See MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at § 281.
28. See MurI A. Larkin, The Right of Confrontation: What Next?, I TEX. TECH L. REv. 67,
71-76 (1969) (mentioning as well England's threat to employ similar procedures in treason trials of
colonists); Lilly, supra note 25, at 211; Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History
and Modem Dress, 8 J. PuB. L. 381, 396-97 (1959).
29. See Pollitt, supra note 28, at 396-97. The English chose to eliminate colonists' rights to
be tried by jury and to confront their accusers due to concern about jury nullification, intimidation
of prosecution witnesses, and prosecutorial convenience. See id.
30. During the process of ratifying the Constitution, demands for a bill of rights that would
include a right of confrontation expressly relied on the danger that civil law trials, such as those of
the Spanish Inquisition, would otherwise be constitutionally allowable. See id. at 399.
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definitively between them. The aim is only to inform a general audience and,
if possible, suggest directions for more rigorous and detailed inquiry.
II. THE COMMON LAW BACKGROUND TO THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Sir Walter Raleigh was tried and convicted of treason, for allegedly plotting
the overthrow and murder of James I, largely on the basis of a sworn affidavit
from Lord Cobham, obtained by the prosecution while Cobham was being held
prisoner in the Tower of London. Secondary evidence came from one Dyer, a
boat pilot, who testified that, while in Portugal, he had ostensibly been told by
a local gentleman that "your King shall never be crowned, for Don Cobham and
Don Raleigh will cut his throat before he come to be crowned." 3 Raleigh
repeatedly and eloquently demanded that Cobham be produced at the trial,
offering absolutely to "put myself upon it" that Cobham would clear him.'
By the time that the Constitution was enacted, Raleigh's position that an
accusing witness such as Cobham ordinarily should be produced had been
accepted in England. Moreover, while Raleigh had merely disparaged the
evidentiary value of Dyer's testimony -- asking what evidence it was against
him, when the conspirators might simply have been using his name without
authorization' -- rules against the use of hearsay had been developed, under
which it likely would be inadmissible, as evidence about an out-of-court
statement (by the Portuguese gentleman) offered as proof of the matter asserted.
Raleigh's reason for wanting Cobham produced was obvious enough. As
Raleigh stood at trial, he had a letter in his pocket from Cobham expressly
recanting the accusation. Thus, he doubtless expected Cobham's appearance to
destroy the prosecution's case. He was unaware that the prosecutor had a more
recent letter from Cobham accusing Raleigh anew, and that Cobham ultimately
would mount the scaffold continuing to affirm Raleigh's guilt. 6 Even had
Raleigh known this, however, the demand for confrontation might still have
been worth making. Would Cobham definitely repeat his accusation in the
setting of a trial, where he was under oath, in public view, and exempt from
immediate duress? Would he effectively condemn to death an old friend and
ally to his face? Even if he would, might the jury regard him as a liar or as
broken by fear of his jailers? If Raleigh were permitted to cross-examine him
(although practice at the time did not permit this), there might be still more to
gain from requiring Cobham to appear in court. For example, even without a
recantation, Raleigh might be able to explore the pressures placed on Cobham
31. DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 436 (1832) [hereinafter JARDINE].
34. Id. at 435-36.
35. Id. at 436.
36. See id. at 446, 476-518.
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to cooperate with the Crown or probe for holes and contradictions in Cobham's
version of events.
All of these possible opportunities, whether or not they passed through
Raleigh's mind, later were afforded to defendants by changes in English criminal
procedure. The trial system changed from one where the accuser did not have
to make his charges in public, under oath, uncoerced at the moment of speech,
in view of the defendant and jury, and subject to cross-examination - to one
where all of these specific opportunities generally were mandatory. In the
course of changing criminal trial procedure, there was no occasion for anyone
to pick and choose among the opportunities afforded to defendants by requiring
in-court testimony. Confrontation rights and limits on the use of hearsay simply
were adopted. Those who made the change thereby replaced one bundle of
procedures, providing defendants with none of these opportunities, with another
bundle that provided all (subject, of course, to exceptions, such as the allowable
use of hearsay).37 This choice was then replicated by the framers of the Sixth
Amendment, when they chose to guarantee what was by then the well-developed
English common law mode of trial and to bar the use of European civil law
methods that, in their rules of evidence (if not their avoidance of a jury),
resembled those used in the trial of Raleigh.'
Why did anyone think that the new bundle of defendant opportunities was
better than what it replaced? One obvious reason was the increased reliability
of verdicts, and in particular the protection of the innocent against erroneous
conviction. Raleigh had stressed this principle in his closing statement, when
he warned the jury that none of them was safe if one could be convicted of
treason "by suspicions and presumptions... without the open testimony of a
single witness. . .. " Blackstone later expressed a similar concern for
reliability, describing the requirement of live testimony at trial as "much more
conducive to the clearing up of truth, than the private and secret examination
taken down in writing before an officer,"' and explaining that hearsay
37. Thus, for example, Blackstone praised the "open examination of witnesses viva voce, in
the presence of all mankind," as preferable to the affidavit procedure still retained in European civil
law, because it activates the witness's sense of shame, ensures that he can correct and explain his
meaning, allows questioning by the judge, jury, and counsel, including the confronting of adverse
witnesses, excites respect and awe in the witness by the presence of the judge, and allows the jury
to observe the witness's demeanor. 3 WILLtAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 373-74 (facs. of First Ed. of 1765-1769) [hereinafter BLACKSTONE].
38. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35. While Raleigh-era English trials resembled those
of the civil law in allowing trial by affidavit, they of course differed not only in the use of a jury
but in being conducted in public, with the defendant present, and with an at least nominally
independent judiciary that ruled on issues of law not fact.
39. JARDINE, supra note 31, at 442.
40. BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at 373.
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generally is not admissible due to "the one general rule that runs through all the
doctrine of trials... [which is] that the best evidence the nature of the case will
admit of shall always be required..."
A second reason for preferring the new bundle, once adversarial notions of
trial had been accepted, may have been aversion to improper behavior by the
State, whether used to convict the innocent or the guilty. Allowing a prosecutor
to rely on inferior evidence, if he thought it helped his case more than the best
evidence, might be considered bad enough in itself. Allowing affidavits had the
further disadvantage of encouraging and rewarding the use of torture in
obtaining them. Raleigh had relied on the jury's holding such sentiments when
he charged that an important witness out-of-court witness (other than Cobham)
had been threatened with torture, and compared the prosecution to the Spanish
Inquisition.' Finally, a third reason for preferring the new bundle of
defendant opportunities may have been symbolic. As Raleigh put it, arguing in
equity for rejection of the type of evidence used against him, "the life of man
is of such price and value, that no person, whatever his offense is ought to die,
unless he be condemned on the [live] testimony of two or three witnesses. "'
Thus, the reasons for supporting the creation of a right of confrontation and
a bar on hearsay, like the set of opportunities that they were meant to provide
at trial, present us with a bundle among which the rules' creators had no
occasion to choose. Even the choices made in developing exceptions to the bar
on hearsay do not illuminate their internal preferences, beyond suggesting that
reliability may be implicated more often than the other reasons. Early hearsay
exceptions, as for proof of dying declarations,' general custom, or business
transactions written down in shopbooks,U allow the use of hearsay that seems
highly reliable where the "better" evidence of in-court testimony either is
unavailable or does not appear to be significantly better. Yet these exceptions
do not rebut the perceived importance of requiring honorable conduct by the
41. Id. at 368. A recent commentator argues that reliability has only recently been thought a
reason for requiring confrontation, which instead serves to ensure the use of adversarial procedures.
Randolph Jonakait, Restoring the Confronation Mause to the Si&th Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REv.
557, 578, 585-86 (1988) [hereinafter Jonakait]. However, a central reason for ensuring the use of
adversarial procedures, protecting the defendant against errors in evaluating the evidence that is
adverse to her (see id. at 594-95) seems fairly similar to ensuring the reliability of guilty verdicts.
42. 9 WiLLAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 230 n.8 (1938) [hereinafter
HOLDSWORTH].
43. JARDINE, supra note 31, at 419. This speech could be construed as going to reliability as
well as to symbolic justice.
44. Dying declarations were considered reliable because they are made "when every hope of
this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most
powerful consideration [of religion] to speak the truth . . ." McCormick, supra note 6, at § 281
n.2, quoting Chief Baron Eyre in Rex v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 168 Eng. Rep. 352 (K.B. 1789).
45. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at 368-69.
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State or symbolic respect for defendants' rights, so much as permit hearsay to
be used where the objections are not significantly raised.4' And some hearsay
exceptions, while arguably consistent with reliability, seem to have been based
more on the other two reasons for the rules.'
While the hearsay rules cannot be explained intelligently without reference
to the policy of reliability - especially given their modem extension to civil
trials, where the other two policies have diminished importance - they do not
follow logically from reliability alone. In particular, one could argue from the
standpoint of reliability that the rules against hearsay are overly exclusionary.
Why not admit hearsay, despite all its flaws, in cases where it is the best
evidence available? Moreover, even if a prosecutor uses hearsay when it is not
the best evidence, why isn't the defendant's power to point this out to the jury
(as Raleigh did), inviting it to draw appropriate inferences, remedy enough?
Inferences aside, if defendants have the power to call their own witnesses (as
Raleigh did not), the parties' incentives in an adversary system seemingly can
be counted on to ensure that all valuable witnesses are produced. Thus, why bar
the use of affidavits and other hearsay unless reliability is not the only policy?
Two answers are possible to this argument against the hearsay rules being
wholly consistent with concern about reliability. First, those who designed the
rules may not have trusted juries to draw the appropriate inferences from the use
of hearsay evidence.' Thus, they may have viewed exclusion as promoting
46. The shopbook and custom rules presumably almost always arose in civil trials. Dying
declarations, to be sure, frequently arose in homicide cases, but they do not involve misconduct by
the State (assuming it is not responsible for the deelarant's impending death) and their admission
presumably was viewed as symbolically appropriate. In treason cases, the revival of the Statute of
Edward VI provided assurance that admissible hearsay would not alone support conviction.
Confrontation and hearsay aside, they included (1) withholding the indictment until trial, thus
hampering Raleigh's preparation of a defense, (2) requiring Raleigh to submit to pre-trial
interrogation without a privilege against self-incrimination, (3) denying Raleigh the right, had he
wanted it, to a lawyer, (4) the license afforded to Sir Edward Coke to engage in vicious invective
and make factual representations going beyond his evidence (along with the judges' more restrained
tendency in the same direction), (5) Lord Chief Justice Popham's endorsement of Cobham's
accusation as persuasive to him, (6) the springing of surprise evidence at the close of trial (albeit
permitted to Raleigh as well as Coke), and (7) non-application of the rule of Edward VI requiring
two witnesses for a treason charge (a rule subsequently formalized in England as well as America;
See HoLDswORTH, supra note 42, at 207).
47. For example, the exception for statements made by co-conspirators during the course of the
conspiracy and in furtherance thereof, while arguably producing reliable evidence, was principally
based on the notion that a co-conspirator is one's agent, and that under an adversarial system one
cannot complain about the adverse consequences of one's own adoptive acts. Bourjaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171, 190-91 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
48. See Note, 7he Theoredcal Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1786
(1980) (rationalizing the hearsay rules as a response to expected errors by the jury in evaluating
hearsay evidence).
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reliability by compensating for the shortcomings of the fact-finder. Second, the
hearsay rules may reflect an erroneous choice of means to promote reliability.
It appears natural to assume that, if evidence is unreliable - that is, highly
questionable and hard to evaluate, not clearly wrong -- the fact-finder should
ignore it. Yet the assumption that questionable evidence should be ignored is
incorrect. The better course, if the fact-finder has sufficient skill, is to evaluate
the evidence gingerly for what it is worth. Nonetheless, in my experience, law
students in Evidence often make the leap from questioning the evidence to
demanding its exclusion all the time. The leap can be seen as well in
Blackstone, in a passage connecting the hearsay rules to reliability, where he
commends England's refusal to admit "dangerous species of [hearsay]
evidence," 49 but without appearing to recognize that excluding uncertain
evidence cannot cure the real uncertainty about which party's version of the facts
is correct.
Thus, even if the hearsay rules are incorrect on grounds of reliability alone,
this does not suggest an intentional choice to sacrifice it to the other objectives,
unless the sacrifice was recognized as such - as it likely was not. The rules
easily could be thought of as advancing all of the policies given, not only the
policies' vagueness, but the "win-win" world of legal argumentation, where
judges and litigants alike tend to describe favored outcomes as wholly good, not
as regrettably sacrificing one set of important values to advance another.5
The undifferentiated mix of policies supporting the hearsay rules, and thus
the closely related Confrontation Clause,5 is all the more significant in that the
policies powerfully influenced not just the decision to have hearsay rules, but
their internal structure. The hearsay exceptions plainly show a willingness to
dispense with the requirement of in-court testimony in circumstances where the
need for it, based on the policies, seems relatively slight and necessity or
convenience argue strongly for admission. Given the hearsay exceptions and the
reasons for their adoption, along with their undoubted permissibility under the
Confrontation Clause (at least where the exceptions are historically supported),
the following statement by Justice Scalia, denying that the Clause's policies
49. BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at 368-69.
50. See generally GuIDo CALABRFsi & PHILUIP BOBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
51. In repeating the truism that the hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are closely
related, I do not mean to suggest that they must be identical in scope. The relationship between the
two has received much attention in the literature; see, e.g., William H. Baker, The Right to
Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and Due Process-A Proposal for Determining When Hearsay
May be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529 (1974); Louis M. Natali, Green, Dutton,
and Chambers: Three Cases in Search of a Theory, 7 RUT.-CAM. L. J. 43 (1975); Frank T. Read,
The New Confrontation-Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1972); Peter Westen, The Future
of Confronation, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1185 (1979); Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75
YALE L.J. 1434 (1966). I address the relationship briefly in the next section.
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influence its application, is incorrect:
[Denying confrontation where its purposes, such as reliability, can be
assured on alternative grounds] abstracts from the right to its purposes
and then eliminates the right. It is wrong because the Confrontation
Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence; it guarantees procedures
that were thought to assure reliable evidence. . . .Whatever else it
may mean in addition, the defendant's constitutional right to be
"confronted with the witnesses against him" means, always and
everywhere, at least what it explicitly says...'
While Scalia is wrong that the rules do not permit abstracting from the
rights usually granted to their purposes (given how the purposes affect the
structure of the hearsay exceptions), and wrong that confrontation is mandatory
in all cases, an atom of truth can be gleaned from what he says. The rules
clearly reflect very strong views that the in-court procedures embraced within
confrontation usually are both necessary and sufficient to guarantee reliability,
and should be followed in the great majority of cases. The following section
discusses more fully the modem constitutional implications of the Confrontation
Clause's origin as a response to cases such as the trial of Raleigh.
III. EVALUATING SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE IN LIGHT OF THE COMMON
LAW BACKGROUND
The common law background to adoption of the Confrontation Clause,
derived from trials such as that of Raleigh and the common law response
thereto, has limited, yet some, value for a historically rooted constitutional
interpretation of the Clause. On the one hand, it provides a clear framework,
consisting of: (1) a bundle of procedures that confrontation embraces: the
accuser must make her charges in public, under oath, while free of coercion, in
view of the defendant and jury, and subject to cross-examination;53 (2) a bundle
of reasons for these procedures: to ensure the reliability of guilty verdicts,
prevent improper behavior by the State, and show symbolic respect for
defendants; and (3) a willingness to deny the procedures in limited circumstances
where the reasons seem less compelling than usual and there are countervailing
52. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3171 (1990) (emphasis in original). As I discuss in
the next section, Justice Scalia erroneously believes that what the Confrontation Clause explicitly
says is that defendants have the "right to meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence
at trial." Id.
53. The Confrontation Clause also guarantees the right to be present at one's trial. See, e.g.,
Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal
Cases, 91 HARv. L. Rav. 567, 569 (1978). 1 have ignored this right because it was not at issue in
the Raleigh ease and has remained largely uncontested thereafter. For the discussion on Raleigh,
see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
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arguments of convenience or necessity. On the other hand, the application of
this framework is significantly under-determined.5'
While both Supreme Court Justices and academic commentators disagree
about the answers, they have evinced - with the solitary exception of Justice
Scalia - surprisingly broad consensus about the questions. Everyone but Scalia
seems to agree that the Confrontation Clause might mean, subject to closer
examination, three principal things: (1) that procedures relating to in-court
witnesses cannot be excessively limited, (2) that certain hearsay statements
cannot be used as evidence if the declarant is available but not called by the
prosecution as a witness, and (3) that certain hearsay statements cannot be used
as evidence, even if the declarant is unavailable, unless they meet minimum
standards of reliability. Not everyone agrees that the Confrontation Clause does
mean all three of these things, but the three issues have framed - and I think
appropriately - both the academic dialogue and Supreme Court doctrine. Thus,
I will discuss them in turn, from the standpoint of what the common law
background may tell us, and then consider Justice Scalia's alternative analysis.
A. Limits on Procedures Relating to In-Court Witnesses
1. Historical Overview
The Confrontation Clause embodies a vision of criminal trials in which not
only do witnesses appear in court to testify against the defendant, but their
appearances have certain familiar characteristics. Prosecution witnesses testify
in public, under oath, subject to cross-examination, before a judge, and face-to-
face with both the defendant and the jury. Since all of these aspects were
assumed, valued, and deliberate parts of the common law trial process, the
common law background suggests a strong presumption that all must generally
be provided.
What little we know about the political process that led to the Confrontation
Clause supports this view. The Clause, along with the rest of the Sixth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights generally, emerged from demands voiced
during the debate over ratifying the Constitution. The demand at issue here was
that the familiar common law mode of trial be guaranteed. As one critic of the
unamended Constitution put it:
54. To be sure, one could take the position that the hearsay exceptions existing at the time of
the Clause's adoption in 1791, and no others, are permissible under it - assuming that practice in
1791 can be reconstructed. Yet this not only would be distressingly rigid as policy, but is far from
obviously correct as constitutional interpretation. Even if one is a strict "originalist," how does one
rebut the argument that the Framers intended the Clause to incorporate into the Constitution an
evolving common law standard?
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 1 [1991], Art. 22
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol26/iss1/22
1991] THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE TODAY 349
The mode of trial is altogether indetermined--whether the criminal is
to be allowed the benefit of counsel; whether he is to be allowed to
meet his accuser face to face; whether he is to be allowed to confront
the witnesses, and have the advantages of cross-examination, we are
not yet told. . . . [C]ongress [is) possessed of powers enabling them
to institute judicatories, little less inauspicious than a certain tribunal
in Spain, which has long been the disgrace of christendom: I mean that
diabolical institution, the Inquisition
The Framers responded to such criticism by promising to enact a bill of
rights that would include a guarantee of the right to common law trial. The
Sixth Amendment then was drafted with language putting the point relatively
broadly and vaguely. It referred to a right of "confrontation" - as distinct from
merely mentioning, say, a right of "cross-examination, " ' or, like some
existing state bills of rights, a right for the defendant "to meet the witnesses
against him face to face.""
This presumably conscious drafting choice, along with the breadth of the
intention to preserve English common law trial procedures, contradict Justice
Scalia's position that only eye contact between the defendant and the accusing
witness is within the literal and direct scope of the Confrontation Clause.
Wigmore's view of the Clause as referring solely to cross-examinations
similarly is weakened by the historical evidence, as prior commentators have
noted." A better view than either would focus on the entire bundle of
confrontation rights and assume that all were meant to be provided in the usual
cse.
The early history of the Clause does not reveal any clear exceptions
permitting particular parts of the bundle - such as, say, eye contact or cross-
55. Mr. Abraham Holmes of Plymouth, speaking at the Massachusetts Convention, quoted in
PoLwrr, supra note 28, at 399. Similarly, Patrick Henry, during the Virgina ratification debates,
complained that "lClongress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the
common law. They may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and Germany-of torturing, to
extort a confession of the crime." See id.
56. See Larkin, supra note 28, at 70.
57. See id. at 76 (quoting preexisting Massachusetts and New Hampshire bills of rights). It is
plausible that these bills of rights were meant to have exactly as broad a meaning as the
Confrontation Clause, but the use of the vaguer term "confrontation" helps to make this intent clear.
58. See generally, WIGMORE, supra note 2.
59. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, at 178-79 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Baker, supra note 51, at 534-36; Larkin, supra note 28, at 69-70. But cf. Read, supra note 51, at
4-8 for a more sympathetic view. Wigmore may have realized that his view was historically suspect
and supported it on grounds of current policy. As paraphrased by Larkin, supra note 28, at 69 n.9,
he concedes that "in the earlier and more emotional periods, actual confrontation was supposed,
Imore often than it now is,' to be able to unstring the nerves of a false witness."
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examination - to be waived when a witness testifies at the defendant's trial.6m
Yet the hearsay exceptions, by allowing testimony from out-of-court declarants,
in effect permitted all to be dispensed with in appropriate cases. If as a group
the bundle of confrontation rights need not always be provided, albeit that it
cannot be dispensed with lightly, it is hard to see why there should be an
absolute rule that, when some of the rights are granted, all must be.61 The
approach of the common law plainly was to permit some flexibility. Moreover,
the lack of historical precedent for picking and choosing among the items in the
bundle is not dispositive, if continued evolution of the rules is permissible (as
with hearsay exceptions) or the grounds relied upon for doing so have only
recently become important. Thus, it should not be unthinkable to dispense with
an item within the bundle of rights, but doing so should require an extremely
good reason - one good enough to support a new hearsay exception.
The Supreme Court has considered the arguable abridgment of rights within
the confrontation bundle in three contexts: (1) where child sex abuse witnesses
were shielded from eye contact with the defendant during their testimony, (2)
where cross-examination was limited by the accusing witness's evidentiary
privilege, and (3) where cross-examination concerning a statement made before
trial by a witness called to testify at trial arguably was impeded by the witness's
claimed forgetfulness. ' In addressing these issues, I believe that the Court
generally has stayed within historically plausible parameters, whether or not one
60. It has long been agreed, however, although I do not know how far back the antecedents go,
that a defendant who disrupts her trial may be removed from the courtroom and thus lose the
opportunity to meet accusing witnesses face-to-face. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1933). It also is conceivable that from an early
point there was an accepted conflict between witnesses' testimonial privileges and the right of cross-
examination.
61. 1 have elsewhere described the bizarre consequencesof treating the package of confrontation
rights, but none of its separate parts, as dispensable. See Shaviro, supra note 18, at 394, noting
that, if a child witness in a sex abuse case has accused the defendant through reliable hearsay falling
within an allowed exception, but the child would be unable to testify at trial unless spared from
having the defendant in sight, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), alongside United States v. Inadi,
475 U.S. 387 (1986), suggest that the prosecution can spare the accusing witness from having the
defendant in sight, but only if it avoids cross-examination by the defendant and denies the defendant
a view of the witness as well. The Supreme Court subsequently held, in Idaho v. Wright, 110 S.
Ct. 3139 (1990), that a child's hearsay statements to a doctor describing the sex abuse that he or she
suffered are not sufficiently reliable to be admitted as hearsay without calling the child to testify.
This removed the most likely scenario for the bizarre juxtaposition that I described, but does not
weaken my basic point.
62. In addition, in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), three members of the Court
endorsed the view that the Confrontation Clause may guarantee a right to pre-trial discovery where
necessary to learn the identities of important witnesses. See id. at 61 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and in the judgment), and at 66-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Ritchie affirmed a state court's
invalidation of a conviction partly on Federal constitutional grounds, but principally under due
process principles and the right to compulsory process.
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agrees with all of its decisions. Yet there are hints of inadequate concern about
defendants' confrontation rights. These hints will grow stronger as we move on
to the next set of issues.
2. Child Sex Abuse Witness Shielded from Eye Contact with Defendant During
Testimony
In Coy v. Iowa,' the Supreme Court reversed a conviction for sexual
abuse of children because at trial a screen had been placed between the
defendant and the child witnesses, permitting him to see them dimly, but
blocking their view of him.' By contrast, in Maryland v. Craig,' the Court
upheld a conviction in a child sex abuse case despite the use to similar effect of
a one-way closed circuit television to record the testimony.' The decisive
difference between the cases - made so by Justices O'Connor and White, who
provided the swing votes - was that in Coy the procedure was automatic upon
request of the complaining witness, whereas in Craig it required a finding by the
trial judge that eye contact would cause the child witness "emotional distress
such that the child cannot reasonably communicate."' 7 Justice O'Connor
explained in her concurrence in Coy, and reiterated in her opinion for the Court
in Craig, that such case-specific findings of necessity were required to overcome
the defendant's important, but not absolute, constitutional right to direct eye
contact.
Justice O'Connor steered between the polar positions of Justice Scalia,'
that the Confrontation Clause unequivocally bars denying this right when the
witness testifies at trial, and of Justice Blackmun that, as Wigmore stated,
"[t]here never was at common law any recognized right to an indispensable
thing called confrontation as distinct from cross-examination."' 9 From a
historical standpoint, given the importance of the entire bundle of confrontation
63. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
64. Id. at 10144-15. All confrontation rights other than eye contact with the defendant were
preserved, and the defendant's lawyer was allowed to step around the screen during cross-
examination.
65. 110S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
66. Under this procedure, the child witness, prosecuting attorney, and defense counsel withdraw
to a separate room for the circuit television taping, accompanied only by the operators of the
television and, if the defendant does not object, a therapist or other person to calm the child. The
defendant and the judge watch the taping and, while it is going on, can communicate electronically
with the persons in the taping room. Id. at 3161.
67. Id.
68. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), and
the dissent in Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3171 (1990), in each case joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.
69. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 n.2 (1988), quodng 5 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
1397 (J. Chadbourne rev. 1974) (emphasis in original).
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rights along with the allowance of some flexibility, she was correct in rejecting
both of these positions and in treating the burden for justifying the states'
procedures as onerous but not insuperable. Indeed, given the variety of
purposes that confrontation is meant to serve, she was correct in holding the
states' procedures to a high standard even if we assume that the procedures
increased reliability (by reducing psychological intimidation of the witnesses).
However, whether she found the right balance, or instead should have found the
burden met either in both cases or in neither, without regard to case-specific
findings by trial judges, is more than the historical record can tell us. The
precise weighing of the balance, as opposed to the choice of broad perspective
from which to weigh it, is historically indeterminate, and beyond the limited
scope of this paper.
3. Cross-Examination Limited by Accuser's Evidentiary Privilege
In Davis v. Alaska,' the Supreme Court reversed a conviction for
burglary because the trial court had relied on a claim of evidentiary privilege to
limit cross-examination of a key prosecution witness.7' The witness had been
on probation as ajuvenile delinquent, and the defendant had wanted to bring this
out on cross-examination to suggest, as a motive for assisting the police, fear of
probation revocation if he failed to cooperate or fell under suspicion himself.1
The trial judge had barred this line of questioning under a state law making
juvenile criminal proceedings confidential, whereupon during cross-examination,
the witness had blandly denied feeling any anxiety about the police
questioning.'
The common law background to the Confrontation Clause, while the
background obviously does not establish whether the limitation was of sufficient
magnitude to justify reversal, 4 provides significant support for the decision.
Surely the right of cross-examination, a vital and perhaps today (as Wigmore
says) the most important aspect of confrontation,75 is impaired when the
defense is barred from suggesting a plausible motive for false testimony.
Agreeing with Wigmore that cross-examination is the most important (if not the
only) confrontation right -- a view that makes the decision more persuasive,
70. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
71. Id. at 318.
72. Id. at 311.
73. Id. at 313.
74. Justice White, dissenting, argued that this was "nothing more than a typical instance of a
trial court exercising its discretion to control or limit cross-examination." Id. at 321 (White, J.,
dissenting). The Supreme Court subsequently held that the rule of Davis v. Alaska does not
automatically lead to reversal even if cross-examination was limited erroneously; rather, the verdict
was subject to "harmless error" analysis. Delaware v. Van Arsdale, 475 U.S. 673, 683 (1986).
75. WIGMORE, supra note 2, at § 13617.
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since that right was not wholly denied here and no other confrontation right was
affected - is neither barred nor supported by the common law background.'
Consistency with the background, along with the subsequent historical trend of
increased reliance on cross-examination, should be enough for all but the most
rigid "originalists."
4. Cross-Examination Concerning Statement Made Before Trial Impeded by
Witness's Forgetfulness at Trial
In California v. Green" and United States v. Owens,' the Supreme
Court upheld convictions based on pre-trial statements by accusers who testified
at the trials and the court rejected arguments that cross-examination was
constitutionally inadequate because impeded by the accusers' claiming
forgetfulness about the subjects of the statements.' In Green, Justice Harlan,
concurring, suggested that the mere opportunity to cross-examine at trial was
constitutionally adequate, even if the claimed amnesia reduced its
effectiveness." The Court, however, held more narrowly only that cross-
examination at trial about a prior statement can be constitutionally adequate."
In Owens, the Court squarely adopted Justice Harlan's position.'
The two cases had significant factual differences that the Court in Owens
did not address. In Green, the witness had accused the defendant, first in a
statement to police and then at a preliminary hearing where he was extensively
cross-examined by the defendant's counsel. He then professed amnesia at trial
on a ground that itself was inconsistent with his prior testimony: that due to drug
use while the original events were occurring, he could not distinguish fact from
fantasy or remember either thereafter."
In Owens, the witness had been savagely assaulted, causing permanent brain
damage and severe, progressive memory impairment. He initially named a third
party as the assailant, and identified the defendant only a month later, while
meeting with an FBI agent who visited him in the hospital. By the time of trial,
76. A historicist also might find significant the lack of strong historical antecedents for the
juvenile criminal proceedings privilege that was at issue in Davis. The case might have been more
difficult if a historically wel-rooted privilege, such as the atorney-client privilege, had been
involved.
77. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
78. 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
79. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. at 563; Californis v. Green, 399 U.S. at 164.
80. California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 188 (Harlan, J., concurring).
81. The Court held that the case was not ripe for deciding whether the mere opportunity to
cross-examine is adequate and, if not, whether it had been adequate here. Id. at 168-70.
82. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. at 559.
83. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 152 (1970).
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the witness had wholly forgotten who assaulted him, but thought he remembered
making the identification during the FBI agent's visit, and feeling certain at the
time that it was correct. He had no memory of any hospital visitors during his
stay other than the agent on this one occasion, although he had received
numerous visitors, both official and personal, including his wife on a daily basis.
He also did not remember whether anyone had suggested to him that the
defendant was responsible. His medical condition made him highly susceptible
to suggestion.
Given these facts, the cases differed in two critical respects. First, the
prior accusatory statements made in open court at the preliminary hearing in
Green (if not those made to a police officer) were far more reliable than those
in Owens, which were entirely derived from a private meeting with a law
enforcement agent. Second, the claim of forgetfulness and its testing under
cross-examination provided a stronger basis for evaluating the testimony in
Green. In Owens, the witness who made the identification arguably was too
different from the one appearing at trial to be impeached by the latter's show of
confusion, since he had suffered, in the interim, nineteen more months of
progressive memory loss.
These characteristics make Owens an extremely troubling case. It is almost
as if, in the trial of Raleigh, the Crown, instead of merely using Lord Cobham's
affidavit, had brought him into court, but under circumstances in which he
remembered nothing but the act of signing it."4 Surely there is a very real
question, ignored by the Court due to its embrace of Harlan's standard, of
whether the cross-examination was able to serve its historically intended
purposes of testing the reliability of the accusation and preventing improper
behavior by the State."
While the facts of Owens suggest difficulties with the position that the mere
opportunity to cross-examine is enough without regard to its potential
effectiveness, one should not be too quick to reach the usual opposing position,
that prior statements cannot be used unless the witness at trial adopts or at least
remembers them. As the Court noted in Green, it simply is not possible,
desirable though it might be, for the jury "somehow [to] be whisked magically
back in time to witness a grueling cross-examination of the declarant as he first
gives his statement."' Moreover, despite the reduced value of cross-
84. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
85. To my mind, the fact the witness's memory was so extraordinarily and conveniently
selective, from the state's perspective, supports a disturbing inference of government misconduct,
at least to the extent of coaching the witness with the knowledge that he was medically highly
suggestible and would not even remember being coached.
86. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 160 (1970).
354
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 1 [1991], Art. 22
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol26/iss1/22
1991] TE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE TODAY
examination when it is conducted later and the witness sidesteps it by not
endorsing the prior statement,' it surely affords the jury some basis to evaluate
the testimony - even in Owens, where some information might have been
obtained from the jury's view of the witness, notwithstanding his progressive
memory loss.
I am more certain that Owens looks like an unfair conviction than that the
problem lay principally in the inevitable inadequacy of cross-examination.
Despite the difficulty in impeaching the person who made the identification, I
can readily imagine a devastating closing argument by defense counsel pointing
out the weaknesses in the prosecution's case. Thus, the reduced value of the
confrontation that was afforded might not have been critical. I might even
hazard a guess, although without any personal knowledge, that a major reason
for the conviction was simply jury bias: the natural desire to punish someone
for the horrible crime and its devastating consequences for the victim.
Thus, while as a Justice I would have been tempted to strike down the
conviction in Owens, I might not have done so under the Confrontation Clause.
I might instead have held that the conviction was based on evidence so
unreliable, and so redolent of possible prosecutorial misconduct, as to be
inadmissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.' Or I
might have held, depending on the rest of the trial record, that the evidence in
the case was inadequate as a matter of law to support the conviction."
The reflexive thinking that I engaged in when I first read Owens - leaping
immediately from doubting the verdict's justice to blaming it on the admission
of suspect, but not wholly worthless, evidence' - is characteristic of the
Anglo-American common-law trial tradition. Again, it is reflected in hearsay
rules that often exclude evidence with some probative value even if the better
form of the evidence is unavailable. Yet, from the standpoint of verdict
accuracy, the reflex (embodied to some extent in the Confrontation Clause) to
exclude evidence simply because it might be inaccurate is mistaken, at least if
we sufficiently trust juries as fact-finders. And if we lack such trust, the trial
system's problems may be too serious to be addressed adequately by the rules
of evidence. Bad fact-finders are likely to reach bad verdicts with or without
87. See Ruhala v. Roby, 150 N.W.2d 146 (Mich. 1967), for a spirited, if not totally
convincing, argument for the proposition that prior statements are most effectively discredited when
the witness endorses them at trial and is subjected to withering cross-examinaion than when she
disavows them at trial.
88. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967).
89. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316-17 (1979).
90. See Shaviro, supra note 18, at 393-95.
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the help of suspect evidence.
B. Prerequisite of Declarant Unavailability for the Use of Hearsay Evidence
A second major strand in Supreme Court and scholarly consideration of the
Confrontation Clause goes to the issue of hearsay declarants' availability to
testify at trial. One can view the Clause as creating a rule of preference for live
testimony, and thus as requiring the prosecution to produce at trial all available
witnesses whose statements it wishes to use. The Clause, under this
interpretation, differs from the Sixth Amendment guarantee to the defendant of
"compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor," in that it applies to
adverse witnesses and the prosecution's case, and is not so much a requirement
of production as a penalty for non-production: exclusion of the hearsay
evidence. Under the unavailability rule, Cobham's affidavit would have been
inadmissible at Raleigh's trial because he was "in the house hard by and may
soon be brought hither.""' Yet the affidavits would not have been barred, at
least under this aspect of the Confrontation Clause, had Cobham died of natural
causes. Nor would Dyer's testimony about the presumably unavailable
Portuguese gentleman have been barred.
Justice Harlan, in his concurrence in Green,' argued that the
Confrontation Clause mandates a strict unavailability rule, without exception, but
nothing more." Although he explicitly recanted this view within less than a
year,' it has proven enduringly popular with commentators, at least as
describing one aspect of the Confrontation Clause." His reason for recanting
it - that it would unduly burden trials by requiring prosecutors to produce all
hearsay declarants even when this was "difficult, unavailing, or pointless " "6 -
has led others to suggest refinements rather than to reject the unavailability rule
altogether.
In recanting, Justice Harlan had in mind hearsay evidence such as business
records, learned treatises, and trade reports, involving declarants who might be
difficult to produce and of almost no use to the defendant. The solution that
others have suggested is simply to limit the circumstances in which the
unavailability rule applies. Peter Westen, for example, suggests applying it only
91. JARDINE, supra note 31, at 427.
92. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970).
93. Id.
94. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S 74, 94-96 (1970) (Harlan, I., concurring).
95. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 51, at 541; Graham, supra note 4, at 190-94; Westen, supra
note 51, at 1189-90; Irving Younger, Confrontadon and Hearsay: A Look Backward, A Peek
Forward, 1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 32, 41-42 (1973).
96. Dunon, 400 U.S. at 96 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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where "the prosecution can reasonably expect the defendant to wish to cross-
examine [the declarant] at that time."' Michael Graham suggests applying it
only where the out-of-court statement is "accusatory," meaning that the
declarant intended to accuse the defendant or was aware of a reasonable
possibility that the prosecution would use her statement as inculpatory
evidence." Laird Kirkpatrick argues that whether the unavailability rule
applies should depend on the statement's centrality to the case, its reliability, its
susceptibility to testing through cross-examination, and on the adequacy of
means of challenging it other than through cross-examination. 99
From a historical standpoint, the unavailability rule is highly persuasive -
leaving aside for now the question of whether, as Justice Harlan argued in
Green, it is the only limitation placed by the Confrontation Clause on the use of
hearsay evidence. Raleigh's position that Cobham should have been produced
won out historically, and helped give rise to hearsay rules that generally
excluded evidence of out-of-court statements if the declarant did not testify at
trial, but that generally permitted witnesses to be questioned at trial about their
prior statements.IW0 Yet the commentators' view that the unavailability rule
should not apply in all cases also seems historically powerful, given early
hearsay exceptions such as the shopbook rule that did not require showing the
declarant's unavailability. The historical record does not, however, provide a
basis for selecting a specific test for waiving the unavailability rule, such as
those of Westen, Graham, or Kirkpatrick. Thus, the decision regarding what
specific test to apply must be made on other grounds that are beyond' this
paper's limited scope.
The Supreme Court follows the unavailability rule "[in the usual
case."' °' The question of how to define the exceptional case, where the rule
does not apply, has largely been left unanswered. In United States v. Inadi,102
however, the Court held that the rule did not apply to at least one category of
admissible hearsay: statements made by the defendant's co-conspirators in
furtherance of the conspiracy and while it was in progress."m The Court
reasoned that, while an in-court appearance, subject to cross-examination,
ordinarily produces better evidence than a hearsay statement, the relative merits
are reversed for co-conspirator statements. Conspirators have more reason to
97. Westen, supra note 51, at 1206-07 (footnote omitted).
98. Graham, supra note 4, at 193-94.
99. Kirkpatrick, supra note 25, at 682.
100. Whether the prior statements were admissible as substantive evidence was a closer
question. See Advisory Committee's Note on FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1), 56 F.R.D. 183, 293.
101. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
102. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
103. Id. at 395.
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be candid, and less to be guarded, when they are conspiring among themselves
than when testifying at trial. Thus, the latter evidence "seldom will reproduce
a significant portion of the evidentiary value" of the former. 4
I find this plausible, although not beyond question, as an assessment of the
relative merits of the two types of statements. As the Court noted in Inadi, a
conspirator's incentives change drastically, and very likely for the worse so far
as truthfulness is concerned, once the conspiracy collapses and criminal charges
are being brought."5 In Inadi itself, the defendant may have felt no great
need for the declarant's testimony, and may have viewed his confrontation rights
merely as a means of causing difficulties for the prosecution (which wanted to
use as evidence a legally authorized wiretap) once the witness, who had duly
been scheduled, claimed car trouble and failed to appear.
Yet co-conspirators' statements may be considerably less reliable than the
Supreme Court seemed to assume. The saying that "there is no honor among
thieves," while perhaps overstated, surely contains some truth. Conspirators
may be misinformed or may intentionally mislead each other. Raleigh noted this
problem when he argued that the plotters must have been using his name without
authorization in order to lend countenance to the conspiracy.
Without cross-examination, it may be difficult to explore and expose at trial
the unreliability of co-conspirator statements. Thus, there are arguments against
their being more reliable than in-court testimony, and even if on balance these
arguments are incorrect, they have a certain historical pedigree. The Anglo-
American legal tradition strongly reflects the views that live testimony is always
more reliable, even if not always required, and that, even where witnesses are
dishonest, cross-examination, in Wigmore's phrase, is "the greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth."'°6
Although not clearly wrong as a matter of policy in holding that the
available witness did not need to be produced, Inadi suggests to me a certain
impatience by the Supreme Court in evaluating defendants' confrontation claims
- a view of defendants in this area as trying to obstruct the course of justice
with needless procedural roadblocks, rather than to test the truth of the
prosecution's case. Why take the time to be originalist or even loosely
104. Id. at 394-95.
105. Id. at 395.
106. WIOMORI, supra note 2, at § 1367. It is not necessarily sufficient to note, as the Supreme
Court did in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 399-400 (1986), that the defense can call
available witnesses whose testimony it wants the jury to hear. Calling a somewhat hostile witness
as part of one's case, to counter the very hostile testimony introduced by the prosecution as hearsay,
may be tactically extremely inferior to requiring the prosecution to produce both simultaneously.
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traditionalist when the interests of effective law enforcement are at stake? A
Court more concerned about defendants' legitimate concerns about sharp tactics
by the prosecution might still have upheld the conviction, but on grounds
showing greater respect for live testimony and cross-examination, and relying
more on the circumstances showing limited need for confrontation in this
case.107 For example, in keeping with Peter Westen's suggestion, the Court
could have conditioned the admission of the hearsay testimony, without
production of the available declarant, on whether the defendant should
reasonably have been expected, under the particular circumstances of the case,
to want immediate cross-examination. Such a rule would empower trial courts
to distinguish between needless procedural roadblocks and rights of legitimate
value to the defense.
This suggestion of impatience becomes stronger when we turn to another
issue raised by the unavailability test: the question of when a witness qualifies
as unavailable. A good illustration is Ohio v. Roberts," s in which the Court
upheld a conviction based on testimony at a pretrial hearing, where the witness
had not appeared at trial.'" One of the central issues in the case was whether
the prosecution had tried hard enough to find her. Its efforts consisted
principally of delivering five subpoenas in her name to her parents' residence,
including three after the authorities learned that she was no longer living
there." ' While it was true that her parents did not know where she was, the
Court conceded that there were numerous steps the prosecution could have taken
in attempting to locate her, but did not."' For example, it failed to contact
a social worker who it knew had been in contact with the witness sometime after
her parents last saw her. " 2
Airily noting that "[olne, in hindsight, may always think of other
things"" 3 that could have been done, the Court concluded that the prosecution
had done enough to show good faith. The Court failed to ask whether the
prosecution might have done more to find the witness had the testimony at the
pre-trial hearing not been so favorable to its case. Yet the problem of varying
effort to search for hard-to-find witnesses, depending on the prosecution's
degree of satisfaction with the preexisting hearsay evidence, is both subtler than
107. Among the various proposed test described above, Michael Graham's (conditioning the
availability requirement on accusatory intent) almost certainly would support the result in Inadi,
assuming that the declarant did not know he was being wiretapped. The outcome under other tests
is unclear. See generally, Graham, supra note 4.
108. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
109. Id. at 77.
110. Id. at 79 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. Ohio v. Roberts 448 U.S. 56, 75 (1980).
112. Id. at 75.
113. Id.
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outright bad faith and potentially quite significant. It deserved consideration,
whether or not it justified deciding Roberts the other way.
C. Requiring Reliability as a Prerequisite for the Use of Hearsay Even if the
Declarant Is Unavailable
The third major strand in Supreme Court and scholarly consideration of the
Confrontation Clause goes to the issue of whether hearsay evidence, in order to
be admitted even if the declarant is unavailable, must meet some minimum
standard of reliability, above the bare requirements applying to all evidence
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Applying such a
standard to the trial of Raleigh, it might follow, for example, that Cobham's
affidavit ought not to have been admitted, given the circumstances under which
it was obtained, even if he had died before trial of natural causes. It also might
follow that Dyer's testimony about the Portuguese gentleman ought not to have
been admitted. Interpreting the Confrontation Clause to establish a reliability
standard for out-of-court statements, even if the declarant is unavailable, would
move in the direction of constitutionalizing some form of the hearsay rules and
limiting the allowable breadth of hearsay exceptions, although solely for the
government in criminal trials.
Wigmore vigorously denied that the Confrontation Clause implied a
reliability standard, largely because, being "fanatically interested in hearsay
reform and opposed to the notion of a special doctrine of criminal
evidence,"" 4 he feared inflexible constitutionalization of the hearsay rules.'I
Justice Harlan agreed with Wigmore, arguing that the Confrontation Clause "is
simply not well designed for taking into account the numerous factors that must
be weighed in passing on the appropriateness of rules of evidence."" 6 One
can reduce the force of these arguments by treating the Confrontation Clause
merely as a floor for constitutionally permissible hearsay rules, establishing
114. Graham, supra note 4, at 104 n.24.
I 15. As William Baker has noted, the basis for Wigmore's position is well conveyed by his
statement that "so bold are nowadays the attempts to wrest the constitution in aid of crime and so
complaisant are some courts in listening to fantastic and unfounded objections to evidence, that the
permissibility of such changes [in the hearsay rules] should not be left in the slightest doubt."
Baker, supra note 50, at 535, quodng WIOMoRE, supra note 2, at § 1397.
116. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). In California v.
Green, Justice Harlan had criticized Wigmore for suggesting that judges could in effect "read [the
Confrontation Clause] out of existence by creating new and unlimited exceptions." Green, 399 U.S.
at 179 (Harlan, J., concurring). In Green, Harlan had disagreed with Wigmore only about
dispensing with the requirement of unavailability, not about the constitutionality of using hearsay
where the declarant was unavailable. Id.
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minimum standards of reliability" 7 but mandating no specific set of exceptions
and allowing broad variation and evolution. Yet Peter Westen criticizes even
this limited constitutionalization of a reliability standard for the use of hearsay.
Noting the general due process bar on the use of unreliable evidence, he asks
advocates of a more demanding threshold for hearsay to
explain why hearsay evidence is categorically different from other
kinds of prosecutorial evidence. Hearsay, after all, is not the only
kind of evidence that can be challenged for lack of trustworthiness.
The same can occur with real evidence, eyewitness identification, and
other kinds of testimonial evidence. Yet no one contends that the due
process standard is inadequate for those kinds of evidence ... "',
One can go beyond this to argue, not just for treating all evidence the same,
but for making the uniform standard, like the due process bar as described by
Westen, a "minimal" one that bars "only the most tendentious and inherently
dubious items of evidence."" 9 The argument relies on the adversary process
to bring weaknesses in the evidence to the jury's attention, and on the jury to
weigh the weaknesses appropriately.
Such an argument may be powerful on its own terms, but has less force
from a historical perspective. The Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules
reflect a strong conviction that witnesses' statements are a special and unusually
unreliable evidence - potentially suffering from the classic flaws of insincerity,
ambiguity, faulty perception, or erroneous memory"2 - unless tested in court
through cross-examination, jury observation of demeanor, and the like. The
Constitution contains the Confrontation Clause, in addition to the Due Process
Clause, for the same reason that the modem Federal Rules of Evidence exclude
hearsay not within a specific exception, in addition to excluding evidence that
is insufficiently probative.' While a view of hearsay as less reliable than,
say, eyewitness identifications that are repeated in court may be wrong,' " this
is our contemporary understanding, not the one prevailing when the Sixth
117. Given the historical reasons for the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules, the
minimum standard could take account not only of reliability, but of deterrence of government
misconduct and symbolic concerns. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
118. Westen, supra note 51, at 1202 (footnote omitted).
119. Id. at 1190.
120. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Trianguladng Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957 (1974).
121. See FED. R. OF EVID. 403 (excluding evidence if "its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay"); and 802 (excluding hearsay except as provided by the hearsay
exceptions).
122. On the under-appreciated inaccuracy of eyewitness identifications, see, e.g., EzrABETH
F. LoFrus & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEwirNES TESIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMIN. (1987).
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Amendment was adopted.
I therefore conclude that the best historical interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause would read it as requiring a showing of reliability, beyond
that necessary for evidence under the Due Process Clause, even if the witness
is unavailable. This is not to say that Westen's constitutional position is flatly
incorrect. Since it is plausible as policy and not explicitly ruled out by either
the text or the history of the Sixth Amendment, one is perfectly justified in
advocating it if one is not a strict "originalist," and views both policy and
history as relevant to interpreting ambiguous provisions in the Constitution." 3
The Supreme Court has agreed that the Confrontation Clause requires that
hearsay evidence which is used against a criminal defendant bear sufficient
"indicia of reliability," going beyond the minimal due process requirements,
even if the declarant is unavailable.' 2 ' In Roberts, the Court stated that, while
this sometimes might require a case-specific inquiry, "[r]eliability can be
inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception.""' The Court seemed not quite to believe itself, however,
as it engaged in a case-specific inquiry despite the apparent applicability of one
such exception.'2 More recently, however, the Court has taken the statement
in Roberts at face value. In Bourjaily v. United States,'" the Court expressly
declined to consider whether the particular co-conspirator statements admitted
against the defendant bore sufficient indicia of reliability, on the ground that co-
conspirator statements are a firmly rooted hearsay exception with a "long
tradition of being outside the compass of the general hearsay exclusion."'
Those who favor a high threshold of reliability under the Confrontation
Clause have criticized the Court's "firmly rooted" rule on two grounds. First,
evidence fitting under many of the "firmly rooted" exceptions may not in fact
be reliable."'' Co-conspirator statements, for example, plainly may be
123. C. William F. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479
(1987) (arguing that history and current policy are both relevant to statutory interpretation).
124. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972).
125. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
126. See id. at 70-72. The evidence in Roberts, testimony at a pretrial hearing, arguably met
the terms of current Federal Rules of Evidence 804(b)(1), which allows the admission of
'[tlestimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding,... if the
party against whom the testimony is now offered . . . had an opportunity and similar motive to
develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination." The Court described this hearsay
exception as firmly rooted. Id. at 66 n.8.
127. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
128. Id. at 183.
129. See Goldman, supra note 25, at 16-46.
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tendentious,'" and the historical reason for the exception has more to do with
notions of agency and estoppel than reliability. 3' Similarly, dying
declarations, although apparently adopted based on the belief that they are
reliable,' 32 in fact may not be,'33 especially in an era where reduced
religious fears of punishment in an afterlife may weaken one of the principal
motives for truthfulness." Second, they argue that the Supreme Court has
been disingenuous in its application of the "firmly rooted" rule. Thus, in
Bourjaily, the Court simultaneously expanded the exception's breadth - easing
the standards for the government's required prior showing that the defendant
was engaged in a conspiracy - and relied on the exception's being firmly rooted
in history.3
The first of these two criticisms, while plainly correct - surely many of the
hearsay exceptions fail to guarantee reliability and may not even have emerged
primarily on that ground - would appear to be irrelevant if one is engaged purely
in reconstructing the most plausible historical meaning of the Confrontation
Clause. A hearsay exception's historical roots, if they reach back to the
eighteenth century, obviously testify to the assumption at the time that
confrontation could appropriately be dispensed with. The argument against the
"firmly rooted" rule therefore must be one of current policy rather than history.
The second criticism, that the Supreme Court simultaneously broadens the
existing hearsay exceptions and purports to rely on their ancient roots, is
considerably more telling historically, and suggests once again a possible
impatience with even historically supportable claims of defendant confrontation
rights.
D. Justice Scalia's Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause
Despite disagreement over details, there is surprising consensus over the
broad picture of what the Confrontation Clause means. It envisions a set of
procedures for in-court witnesses, perhaps most importantly cross-examination,
but not limited thereto. It requires that witnesses whose statements are used as
evidence against the defendant be called by the State to testify at trial if they are
available, but subject to some set of reasonable exceptions. Finally (and more
130. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
131. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 188-190 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Goldman, supra note 25, at 39-41.
132. See MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at § 281 n.2.
133. See Goldman, supra note 25, at 24-26.
134. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2), advisory committee notes. It may not, however, be true,
other than for academics and other members of the intelligentsia, that religious belief in this country
has declined over the last two centuries. See GARY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND AMERICAN
POLITICS (1990).
135. See Boujaily v. United States 483 U.S. 171, 199-202 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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controversially), it requires that hearsay evidence used without confronting the
declarant at trial meet minimum standards of reliability.
In disagreement with this framework of analysis, one person stands alone:
Justice Scalia." While apparently willing to accept most Supreme Court
precedents in the area, on the ground that they state rights implied by or
collateral to confrontation, 3 ' he argues that confrontation itself, and thus the
explicit, irreducible meaning of the Clause, extends to only one thing: eye
contact between the defendant and accusing witnesses while they testify in
court. 138
Justice Scalia derives his unique view principally from three sources. First
is the ostensible plain meaning of the word "confrontation" itself, which he
thinks denotes a face-to-face encounter between the defendant and the accusing
witness "simply as a matter of English." He ignores the point that
"confrontation" also, as a matter of English, denotes a hostile encounter and
thus suggests that adversarial interaction (such as cross-examination?) is
similarly at the heart of the Clause. Second, he argues that his interpretation
follows "[s]imply as a matter of Latin as well, since the word 'confront'
ultimately derives from the prefix 'con-' (from 'contra' meaning 'against' or
'opposed') and the noun 'frons' (forehead)."" 4  Why this is relevant to the
word's meaning in eighteenth century or current legal usage remains
unspecified. Third, he traces the right to a face-to-face encounter to the
beginnings of Western legal culture, as evidenced by the following sources: the
words of the Roman Governor Festus, 4 ' a speech by Shakespeare's Richard
136. Justice Scalia's opinions in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), and Maryland v. Craig,
110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990), stating his view, were joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.
(Justices White and O'Connor also joined Justice Scalia's opinion in Coy, but filed a concurring
opinion that stated a different view and then followed that opinion to reach a different conclusion
than Scalia's in Craig.) Other Confrontation Clause opinions by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens make it clear, however, that even if they agree with Justice Scalia's central point about the
importance of eye contact between the defendant and the accusing witnesses, they take a far broader
view of the Confrontation Clause in other respects. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 77-82
(1980) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. See Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3172-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 3171-75.
139. Coy, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1980) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). The above
phrase is quoted from Justice Harlan's opinion in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1971),
which describes the Confrontation Clause as conferring "at least a right to meet face to face all those
who appear and give evidence at the trial." Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016, quoting California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 175 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan, however, argued in Green that the
production of available witnesses was at the heart of the Clause, and in Dutton that it principally
conferred a right of cross-examination. See id. at notes 149-52.
140. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1980).
141. Id. at 1015.
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II," and the childhood memories of Dwight Eisenhower.' 43 Yet he fails to
consider the more specific roots of the Confrontation Clause in .eighteenth
century English common law. I "
There remains for Justice Scalia the problem of whether all declarants
whose statements are used against the defendant must make eye contact with her
while they provide their evidence, in which case no hearsay evidence would be
admissible. This, he says, depends on whether the term "witnesses" in the
Confrontation Clause refers to all persons who know or see anything about the
facts of the case or instead only to the witnesses appearing at trial."0 He then
continues:
The former meaning (one "who knows or sees") would cover hearsay
evidence, but is excluded in the Sixth Amendment by the words
following the noun: "witnesses against him." The phrase obviously
refers to those who give testimony against the defendant at trial."4
It is difficult to imagine a more complete and unconvincing non sequitur.
Concededly, the words "against him" establish that the "witnesses" covered by
the Sixth Amendment are only a subset of all persons having knowledge about
the defendant's case. On what ground, however, does Justice Scalia conclude
that the subset consists only of those persons appearing at the trial? Why cannot
the term "witnesses against him" refer to all persons having knowledge about
the case and whose statements reporting such knowledge the prosecution uses
as evidence against the defendant? Under that meaning, hearsay declarants
would be included. Looking at the words "witnesses against him" in isolation
from a "plain meaning" perspective, that interpretation appears at least as
plausible as the one that Justice Scalia so rapidly concludes is "obvious."
I have already suggested that Justice Scalia's view is contradicted by the
history of the Sixth Amendment and the drafters' decision to refer to
confrontation rather than (like some existing state bills of rights) to a meeting
142. Id. at 1016.
143. Id. at 1017. All three of these quotations were apparently derived from the scholarly
literature. See Graham, supra note 4, at 107 n.42 (Richard I); PouxrT, supra note 28, at 381
(Eisenhower) and 384 (Festus). Justice Scalia spared us an anecdote from Pollitt, supra note 28,
at 384, involving the Roman Emperor Trajan.
144. From a methodological standpoint, one can only wonder what Justice Scalia who condemns
reliance on isolated "snippet[s]" of legislative history (Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 947
(1988)) would make of this motley selection of supporting authorities from the history of Western
culture.
145. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
146. Id. at 3173-74.
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"face to face."1 47 It is worth noting as well how oddly his view would apply
to the Raleigh trial. Under it, the Confrontation Clause would have no direct
bearing on the trial. It would not bar Cobham's evidence, because he did not
appear at the trial as a witness. Nor, for the same reason, would it bar the
evidence of the Portuguese gentleman. The Confrontation Clause, Justice Scalia
would have us believe, has little to do with trial by affidavit as practiced in
Tudor and Stuart England. Rather, with remarkable foresight, it was drafted
two centuries ago to deal, directly and literally, with almost no cases other than
Coy v. Iowa and Maryland v. Craig, the 1980s child sex abuse cases in which
the state attempted to shield the child witness from eye contact with the
defendant through the use of closed circuit television or a screen.
Justice Scalia's approach seems not only wrong, but poorly thought
through. It extracts one right from a larger bundle and simply assumes that
right to stand alone at the heart of the Confrontation Clause. Justice Scalia
displays little interest in careful textual analysis, less knowledge about the
history most relevant to interpreting the language, and least of all the modesty
to wonder why everyone else's views over the last century have been so
different from his own. This shoddy performance is all the more disappointing
given that Justice Scalia's position about the procedures in Coy and Craig is
plausible, on grounds of both history and policy," and given the admirable
conviction he evidently holds that he is staunchly defending an important right
"against the tide of prevailing current opinion."49
The Supreme Court majority, by contrast, has more or less remained within
the boundaries of a plausible interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. For
sound reasons of history, it continues to view the Clause as excluding some
evidence that arguably should get in, from the standpoint of reliability alone, if
one trusts juries, with the assistance of defense counsel, to recognize the defects
of hearsay evidence. In subtle ways, however, more alarming as evidence of
a broader methodology than for themselves, the Court has tilted towards
prosecutors in confrontation cases, at times ignoring legitimate defense concerns
or applying legal standards inconsistently. For the future, one can only wonder
how well the Confrontation Clause will weather being interpreted by those who,
in their sympathies, seem less the heirs of Sir Walter Raleigh than of the judges
who denied him confrontation lest the jury be "inveigled.""5
147. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
148. 1 would decide Coy and Craig for the government, but uneasily, given not only the history
but the possibility of unfair prejudice to the defendant.
149. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3171 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. JARDINE, supra note 31, at 427.
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